By Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell
The spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states threatens international security. While North Korea, Iran and Pakistan dominate global nuclear proliferation concerns, other states operating on the periphery of the international system - such as Myanmar - are at risk of becoming the next proliferation challenge.
Although there is no verifiable evidence to show Myanmar, also known as Burma, is actively seeking nuclear weapons, a systematic review of nuclear proliferation risk factors finds that the country's reclusive ruling generals are at high risk of desiring them. Myanmar's military leaders have intense security threat perceptions which stem from fear of a Western-led invasion, and they likely view nuclear weapons as a means to protect the country's core interests.
When suggestions were made recently by Georgetown University professor David Steinberg to Myanmar officials that their fears were misguided, they cited a series of recent United States invasions of other states, including Grenada, Lebanon, Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to justify their concerns. The recent surprise US decision to bomb Libya after its leader Muammar Gaddafi willingly gave up his nuclear program in 2003 undoubtedly intensified Myanmar's concerns of a possible US invasion in the name of promoting democracy.
With those heightened threat perceptions, Myanmar likely sees North Korea as a model of a state that uses nuclear weapons to deter Western aggression. Myanmar's military leaders also appear to believe that nuclear weapons would provide them with international status and enhanced bargaining power.
History has shown Myanmar is largely invulnerable to coercive diplomacy tools such as economic and diplomatic sanctions. Isolated for over two decades, Myanmar has adapted to operating on the fringes of the global system. Meanwhile, current US-led economic sanctions against the country have been largely ineffective, primarily because they are not internationally coordinated and enforced.
The threat of a near-term nuclear weapons program in Myanmar ultimately hinges on North Korea. Myanmar's burgeoning military relationship with North Korea could provide it with an accelerated nuclear pathway that compensates for its lack of indigenous nuclear scientific and engineering expertise. Myanmar has purchased conventional arms and missile technology from North Korea in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution's (UNSCR) 1718 and 1874. Reports suggest these shipments could have contained nuclear weapons-related materials.
Given recent international proliferation trends, successful non-proliferation policy must focus on keeping countries from wanting nuclear weapons in the first place. Technological barriers to entry make it unlikely that Myanmar could develop an indigenous program within the next decade but covert assistance from its military partner, North Korea, could accelerate this timeline.
Past case studies on nuclear decision-making show that once a country's leadership commits to acquiring nuclear weapons, it becomes exceedingly difficult to reverse the decision. It is far easier to influence states away from initiating a nuclear weapons program than it is to convince them to abandon or halt an existing one. In order to curb a nuclear weapons progression, new policy is needed now that steers Myanmar's strategic calculations away from the nuclear option.
The US should consider Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic consideration of its foreign policy interests in the region, including nuclear non-proliferation. Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not mean casting aside human-rights issues, which were the initial motivation for imposing economic sanctions. In fact, reducing the threat perceptions of Myanmar's senior generals could allow for more direct and meaningful humanitarian assistance to the county, as was eventually allowed after the 2008 Cyclone Nargis disaster.
Tradeoffs between human-rights and non-proliferation objectives may be required, but they are not mutually exclusive. It is worth noting that former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and other US officials reportedly pushed for democratization and human rights to be included as part of any deal with Gaddafi to halt his nuclear program.
Moving beyond the issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to democratization and human rights would have put that particular deal in jeopardy, and the final US decision against including these issues in the negotiations turned out to be instrumental to their success. Yet Libya did not get a pass on human-rights issues and today faces a UN-authorized "no-fly zone" over Libya authorizing "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and halt Gaddafi's abuse of his own citizens.
Our research found that security concerns are a significantly high risk factor for Myanmar and steps are needed to ease its military leadership's fear of a possible US invasion. Security threat perceptions are a significant factor in a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. In turn, a more favorable security outlook is one of the major reasons why a state could decide to reverse its nuclear course.
Succor over sanctions
The US and its allies should increase military-to-military engagement with Myanmar to build trust and reduce threat perceptions. Indonesia's military had similar US threat perceptions to Myanmar until the 2004 tsunami, when the US military provided rapid and large scale humanitarian and disaster relief assistance and then left after the mission was accomplished.
Engagement with all levels of Myanmar's military leadership is key. Military-to-military exchange would be the most productive engagement track, as Myanmar military members would likely be most comfortable dealing with their US military counterparts. Just as Libya expressed an interest in having its students attend US universities, military-to-military educational engagement may pique the interest of Myanmar's military leadership.
In the years preceding the Myanmar military's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988, the majority of its officers were trained outside of the country, including in the US via the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Some of these officers are still in the military today and could be eager to resume this and other mutually beneficial programs.
In that direction, Myanmar military officers could be invited to take part in military education training sessions - such as those offered by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies - to better educate them on international norms for civilian control of the military. The sessions could also offer instruction on how to adequately address comprehensive security threats, such as disaster management and health and environmental protection issues.
The Barack Obama administration's policy of "pragmatic engagement" with Myanmar is on the right track, but it needs to be significantly enhanced to succeed. In particular, Obama's government should pursue a step-by-step process that encourages reform instead of regime change. Current US sanctions, which include a ban on trade and investment as well as military-to-military engagement, is perceived by Myanmar's leaders as advancing the ultimate goal of regime change.
Ultimately, Myanmar's isolation should be decreased. Greater integration into the international community may create opportunity costs for Myanmar's leadership that impact the economic and political feasibility of beginning a nuclear weapons program. It may also boost Myanmar's perceived international standing and counter its apparent belief that nuclear weapons provide status and political influence.
United States efforts to engage Myanmar can serve this purpose, though to date Myanmar has largely spurned Obama's engagement overtures. Given the lack of trust between the two nations, the US needs to consider cooperating more with Myanmar's key trade partners, including China, India and Thailand, to effect change.
Since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted Myanmar into the regional grouping in 1997, it has attempted to bring Myanmar back into the fold through policies of engagement that enhance economic linkages. To date, the US has opposed ASEAN's engagement; Obama should consider a policy course shift that supports these collaborative efforts.
At the same time, the risk of a near-term nuclear weapons program in Myanmar is ostensibly eliminated if North Korean assistance can be blocked. In Libya's case, exposing and disrupting Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's secret proliferation network changed Gaddafi's perceptions of the technical and clandestine feasibility of a nuclear weapons program and ultimately contributed to his decision to bring it to a halt. If North Korea and other nuclear proliferators are taken out of the equation, the risk of Myanmar's military leadership opting for nuclear weapons will similarly be substantially reduced.
During former US ambassador to the United Nations and New Mexico governor Bill Richardson's visit to North Korea in December 2010, he asked his North Korean counterparts if they were exporting nuclear technologies to Syria and Myanmar. In an interview with the authors, Richardson summarized Pyongyang's response as "maybe". He added that his North Korean counterparts said that they had few ways to obtain foreign exchange given the extensive international sanctions they faced.
Historically, North Korea has categorically denied sponsoring illicit activities or initiating provocative attacks, so their candid response to Richardson was surprising. This highlights a possible carrot-based approach to dealing with North Korea's onward proliferation: convincing Pyongyang to halt its illicit nuclear trade in exchange for legitimate trade opportunities. In a globalized world, stopping nuclear technology transfers will remain difficult as long as North Korea, Pakistan and Iran continue to furtively operate outside of international norms.
The policy recommendations in this article focus on several areas where the US may be able to improve cooperation with Myanmar for mutual benefit. Some of these recommendations require substantial efforts from China and ASEAN to be more effective in reshaping Myanmar's stance on human rights, civil liberties and democratic values. So far all of Myanmar's allies have prioritized economic over political and strategic engagement.
With the political pressure exerted by Myanmar's exile-run activist groups, policy recommendations are slow to be implemented and often filled with controversy.
Yet the risk of Myanmar launching a nuclear weapons program is high and actions should be taken urgently to prevent a dangerous and unpredictable regime from obtaining such a destabilizing capacity. Leveraging the international community's collective "soft power" and a change in outlook in the US is the best way forward to ensuring a peaceful and nuclear free Myanmar.
Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell are National Security Fellows at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Department of Defense or the US government.
Source:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MF07Ae01.html
The spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states threatens international security. While North Korea, Iran and Pakistan dominate global nuclear proliferation concerns, other states operating on the periphery of the international system - such as Myanmar - are at risk of becoming the next proliferation challenge.
Although there is no verifiable evidence to show Myanmar, also known as Burma, is actively seeking nuclear weapons, a systematic review of nuclear proliferation risk factors finds that the country's reclusive ruling generals are at high risk of desiring them. Myanmar's military leaders have intense security threat perceptions which stem from fear of a Western-led invasion, and they likely view nuclear weapons as a means to protect the country's core interests.
When suggestions were made recently by Georgetown University professor David Steinberg to Myanmar officials that their fears were misguided, they cited a series of recent United States invasions of other states, including Grenada, Lebanon, Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to justify their concerns. The recent surprise US decision to bomb Libya after its leader Muammar Gaddafi willingly gave up his nuclear program in 2003 undoubtedly intensified Myanmar's concerns of a possible US invasion in the name of promoting democracy.
With those heightened threat perceptions, Myanmar likely sees North Korea as a model of a state that uses nuclear weapons to deter Western aggression. Myanmar's military leaders also appear to believe that nuclear weapons would provide them with international status and enhanced bargaining power.
History has shown Myanmar is largely invulnerable to coercive diplomacy tools such as economic and diplomatic sanctions. Isolated for over two decades, Myanmar has adapted to operating on the fringes of the global system. Meanwhile, current US-led economic sanctions against the country have been largely ineffective, primarily because they are not internationally coordinated and enforced.
The threat of a near-term nuclear weapons program in Myanmar ultimately hinges on North Korea. Myanmar's burgeoning military relationship with North Korea could provide it with an accelerated nuclear pathway that compensates for its lack of indigenous nuclear scientific and engineering expertise. Myanmar has purchased conventional arms and missile technology from North Korea in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution's (UNSCR) 1718 and 1874. Reports suggest these shipments could have contained nuclear weapons-related materials.
Given recent international proliferation trends, successful non-proliferation policy must focus on keeping countries from wanting nuclear weapons in the first place. Technological barriers to entry make it unlikely that Myanmar could develop an indigenous program within the next decade but covert assistance from its military partner, North Korea, could accelerate this timeline.
Past case studies on nuclear decision-making show that once a country's leadership commits to acquiring nuclear weapons, it becomes exceedingly difficult to reverse the decision. It is far easier to influence states away from initiating a nuclear weapons program than it is to convince them to abandon or halt an existing one. In order to curb a nuclear weapons progression, new policy is needed now that steers Myanmar's strategic calculations away from the nuclear option.
The US should consider Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic consideration of its foreign policy interests in the region, including nuclear non-proliferation. Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not mean casting aside human-rights issues, which were the initial motivation for imposing economic sanctions. In fact, reducing the threat perceptions of Myanmar's senior generals could allow for more direct and meaningful humanitarian assistance to the county, as was eventually allowed after the 2008 Cyclone Nargis disaster.
Tradeoffs between human-rights and non-proliferation objectives may be required, but they are not mutually exclusive. It is worth noting that former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and other US officials reportedly pushed for democratization and human rights to be included as part of any deal with Gaddafi to halt his nuclear program.
Moving beyond the issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to democratization and human rights would have put that particular deal in jeopardy, and the final US decision against including these issues in the negotiations turned out to be instrumental to their success. Yet Libya did not get a pass on human-rights issues and today faces a UN-authorized "no-fly zone" over Libya authorizing "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and halt Gaddafi's abuse of his own citizens.
Our research found that security concerns are a significantly high risk factor for Myanmar and steps are needed to ease its military leadership's fear of a possible US invasion. Security threat perceptions are a significant factor in a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. In turn, a more favorable security outlook is one of the major reasons why a state could decide to reverse its nuclear course.
Succor over sanctions
The US and its allies should increase military-to-military engagement with Myanmar to build trust and reduce threat perceptions. Indonesia's military had similar US threat perceptions to Myanmar until the 2004 tsunami, when the US military provided rapid and large scale humanitarian and disaster relief assistance and then left after the mission was accomplished.
Engagement with all levels of Myanmar's military leadership is key. Military-to-military exchange would be the most productive engagement track, as Myanmar military members would likely be most comfortable dealing with their US military counterparts. Just as Libya expressed an interest in having its students attend US universities, military-to-military educational engagement may pique the interest of Myanmar's military leadership.
In the years preceding the Myanmar military's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988, the majority of its officers were trained outside of the country, including in the US via the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Some of these officers are still in the military today and could be eager to resume this and other mutually beneficial programs.
In that direction, Myanmar military officers could be invited to take part in military education training sessions - such as those offered by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies - to better educate them on international norms for civilian control of the military. The sessions could also offer instruction on how to adequately address comprehensive security threats, such as disaster management and health and environmental protection issues.
The Barack Obama administration's policy of "pragmatic engagement" with Myanmar is on the right track, but it needs to be significantly enhanced to succeed. In particular, Obama's government should pursue a step-by-step process that encourages reform instead of regime change. Current US sanctions, which include a ban on trade and investment as well as military-to-military engagement, is perceived by Myanmar's leaders as advancing the ultimate goal of regime change.
Ultimately, Myanmar's isolation should be decreased. Greater integration into the international community may create opportunity costs for Myanmar's leadership that impact the economic and political feasibility of beginning a nuclear weapons program. It may also boost Myanmar's perceived international standing and counter its apparent belief that nuclear weapons provide status and political influence.
United States efforts to engage Myanmar can serve this purpose, though to date Myanmar has largely spurned Obama's engagement overtures. Given the lack of trust between the two nations, the US needs to consider cooperating more with Myanmar's key trade partners, including China, India and Thailand, to effect change.
Since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted Myanmar into the regional grouping in 1997, it has attempted to bring Myanmar back into the fold through policies of engagement that enhance economic linkages. To date, the US has opposed ASEAN's engagement; Obama should consider a policy course shift that supports these collaborative efforts.
At the same time, the risk of a near-term nuclear weapons program in Myanmar is ostensibly eliminated if North Korean assistance can be blocked. In Libya's case, exposing and disrupting Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's secret proliferation network changed Gaddafi's perceptions of the technical and clandestine feasibility of a nuclear weapons program and ultimately contributed to his decision to bring it to a halt. If North Korea and other nuclear proliferators are taken out of the equation, the risk of Myanmar's military leadership opting for nuclear weapons will similarly be substantially reduced.
During former US ambassador to the United Nations and New Mexico governor Bill Richardson's visit to North Korea in December 2010, he asked his North Korean counterparts if they were exporting nuclear technologies to Syria and Myanmar. In an interview with the authors, Richardson summarized Pyongyang's response as "maybe". He added that his North Korean counterparts said that they had few ways to obtain foreign exchange given the extensive international sanctions they faced.
Historically, North Korea has categorically denied sponsoring illicit activities or initiating provocative attacks, so their candid response to Richardson was surprising. This highlights a possible carrot-based approach to dealing with North Korea's onward proliferation: convincing Pyongyang to halt its illicit nuclear trade in exchange for legitimate trade opportunities. In a globalized world, stopping nuclear technology transfers will remain difficult as long as North Korea, Pakistan and Iran continue to furtively operate outside of international norms.
The policy recommendations in this article focus on several areas where the US may be able to improve cooperation with Myanmar for mutual benefit. Some of these recommendations require substantial efforts from China and ASEAN to be more effective in reshaping Myanmar's stance on human rights, civil liberties and democratic values. So far all of Myanmar's allies have prioritized economic over political and strategic engagement.
With the political pressure exerted by Myanmar's exile-run activist groups, policy recommendations are slow to be implemented and often filled with controversy.
Yet the risk of Myanmar launching a nuclear weapons program is high and actions should be taken urgently to prevent a dangerous and unpredictable regime from obtaining such a destabilizing capacity. Leveraging the international community's collective "soft power" and a change in outlook in the US is the best way forward to ensuring a peaceful and nuclear free Myanmar.
Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell are National Security Fellows at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Department of Defense or the US government.
Source:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MF07Ae01.html
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