With the formation of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) by Burma’s Prime Minister Thein Sein and a group of current government ministers, one of the last and most important pieces of the junta’s jigsaw puzzle is now in place. As a result, a clear picture is emerging of how the regime plans to maintain its grip on both military and political power after the election.Gen Thein Sein (second from left), along with other senior leaders of the Burmese junta, attends a miltary parade marking Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27.
The Birth of the USDP
The 2008 Constitution, approved in a heavily criticized referendum pushed through by the regime in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, states that the sixth objective of the Union is to enable the Tatmadaw (armed forces) to participate in the political leadership of the state.
But it now appears that what the sixth objective really means is the Tatmadaw will become the political leadership of the state.
Thein Sein and 26 other military leaders, all of whom are also current government ministers and deputy ministers, registered the
USDP at the Union Election Commission (EC) on April 29. The UEC approved the new party five days later, and the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was dissolved two days after that.
Other than Thein Sein, few of the USDP leaders have been officially identified, but they are believed to include: Soe Tha, the minister of National Planning & Economic Development; Brig-Gen Aung Thein Linn, the Rangoon mayor; Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, the information minister; and Aung Thaung, the minister of Industry-1, according to a source who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to make the information public.
The party is expected to contest all open constituencies nationwide, which amounts to 75 percent of the seats of the union parliament, as well as parliaments of states and divisions.
Commenting on the registration of the USDP, Win Tin, a veteran leader of the opposition NLD, told The Irrawaddy the move represents an attempt by the junta to prolong its rule.
“Some said the election shows the military junta is preparing to withdraw from politics systematically, but what I see is that the generals are systematically trying to keep power with legitimacy,” Win Tin said. “Prime Minister Thein Sein’s formation of a new party is a good example.”
Prior to the formation of the USDP, the junta ordered the retirement of Thein Sein and Aung Thein Lin from their military positions, along with 20 other ministers and senior officials holding ranks of full army general and brigadier-general.
Even before his military resignation, state-run newspapers began referring to the prime minister as “U Thein Sein,” using the Burmese honorific term instead of “Gen Thein Sein,” as they had previously.
Attending a state-organized exhibition wearing civilian clothes rather than a military uniform, Thein Sein looked awkward and asked the attendees: “Do you still remember me?” He then smiled with satisfaction when he heard a voice reply, “Yes, Bogyoke [general]!”
The state media also began using the honorific “U” for the other ministers, and at the same time the junta stopped referring to itself as a “Tatmadaw government,” which it had done consistently since 1988.
The former military officers are expected to be appointed as USDP chairmen in states and divisions. They will also stand as candidates in the election under the USDP banner, according to sources.
In an opinion piece written in The Irrawaddy’s online edition, Burma analyst Dr. Zarni noted that the US State Department’s Phillip Crowley rhetorically asked whether the resignations meant that the regime will “open up” or whether it simply amounts to “wolves changing to sheep’s clothing.”
Zarni added his own metaphor, writing, “...
“As a matter of fact,” he wrote, “the resignations on April 26 were nothing more than obedience as military subordinates to Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s order to play a different role in the junta leader’s election game.”
Despite the military resignations, Thein Sein and the other USDP founders have not resigned their current ministerial positions, and some analysts say that they broke the junta’s own Political Party Registration Laws, which bar civil services personnel from forming political parties and using government property for political purposes [see box, p. 14].
The USDP’s Prodigious Mother
The USDP may be the largest political party ever to be formed in Burma. As the name makes clear, the mother of the USDP is the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which claims to have more than 24 million members.
Thein Sein, along with junta chief Than Shwe and other key regime members such as Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, Gen Shwe Mann and Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo, are members of the USDA Central Panel of Patrons.
The ministers joining Thein Sein on the USDP ticket have also been members of the USDA central executive committee and secretariat.
The USDA was formed by the regime’s top generals in 1993 to foster “political leadership” among civilians and to form a people’s militia to carry out the regime’s “People’s War Strategy,” which was intended to protect the state from internal and external threats.
During the 1990s, civil servants (including the armed forces) and many teachers and students were coerced into joining the USDA.
Ostensibly formed as a social organization, the USDA is in fact a civilian structure of the regime, and its policies mirror those of the ruling State Peace and Development Council. Wearing a white shirt and green longyi, the USDA’s civilian uniform, the members of the organization are used by the generals to promote the junta’s image in the eyes of the public.
The fact that the USDA would eventually form a political party has been an open secret since Htay Oo, the general secretary of the organization, publicly spoke about the matter in 2005.
Some Burma observers had assumed that the USDA would transform itself into a political party and contest the 2010 election. But with the formation of the USDP, it becomes clear that the USDA will remain the country’s main civilian organization, which will prove useful to both the military and political wings of the junta.
Since its formation, the regime has utilized the USDA for different purposes that are indicative of how the fledgling USDP may enlist the services of its parent organization, both during and after the campaign.
One of the USDA’s roles has been violence and intimidation, best illustrated by the Depayin attack in 2003, when a USDA mob attempted to assassinate democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi and killed dozens of her supporters. Given its history, the USDA could be used to intimidate opposition parties and force its own members to vote for USDP candidates.
In addition to campaign muscle, the USDA can provide the USDP with both human and financial resources. The USDA’s nationwide membership of 24 million has access to virtually unlimited campaign funds. As a result, the USDP will be able to contest seats throughout the country and will be by far the most visible name in the press, on TV, in the streets, in town halls, and in public gatherings.
If the ministers who formed the USDP do not resign prior to the election, they may also have access to state resources, not to mention their own power to influence voters by virtue of their high-level positions in government.
Some state resources are being transferred directly to the USDA. The Ministry of Energy recently announced that the USDA will receive state-run fuel stations from the government, with the USDA expected to acquire at least 30 percent of the 246 stations to be transferred by the regime to private interests.
In addition, the election laws allow political parties to run their own businesses, so the USDP itself could become a money-making venture.
In the few constituencies where the USDP is not expected to do well, such as ethnic regions, the USDA could play a role in voter intimidation and harassment, voter restrictions, ballot box fixing, pre-marked ballots or other forms of electoral fraud to ensure the result goes the USDP’s way.
Dr. Zarni summed up the voters’ predicament: “If, on the one hand, they [voters] turn up to vote for even remotely acceptable candidates, their electoral participation will afford the generals the opportunity to proclaim the election a success. On the other hand, if the public doesn’t turn up to vote, the cheaters in power, in mufti or still in uniform, will confiscate their votes, giving them away to pro-military candidates and still declare a landslide for their [party].”
Finally, its resources give the USDA, and thereby the USDP, the ability to barter for votes.
Observers note that the USDP is now engaged in work in many townships such as lending money, drilling wells for drinking water, arranging citizen ID cards, providing free tuition classes, free medical treatment and other goods and services. People who receive such benefits must agree to vote for USDP party candidates.
One student, who will vote for the USDP candidates, said,“I promised my parents I will vote for the USDP. We got the electric meter box for our house by the help of the USDA. So we will vote for them.”
USDP members still in government are now campaigning under the guise of “inspecting” USDA development projects. The USDA is also pounding the pavement for its political offspring, actively recruiting new party members in Rangoon and other townships.
“The USDA is going from door to door, collecting names of family members, and asking if we want to join their party,” said a retired government official in South Dagon Township in Rangoon.
The Junta’s Gift-wrapped Constitution
The USDP and USDA clearly have a head start and will do everything in their power to avoid a repeat of the military regime’s miscalculation in 1990, when it inadvertently allowed the opposition to win the election.
Fortunately for the USDA and her newborn USDP, the junta has delivered the 2008 Constitution in a perfectly wrapped package.
Under the Constitution, the parliament is divided into two houses: the People’s Assembly (Lower House) elected based on township as well as population, and the National Assembly (Upper House) with an equal number of representatives from each state or region.
Twenty-five percent of the representatives in the Lower House and Upper House will be military officials appointed by the commander-in-chief of the Tamadaw.
A majority vote of both houses is sufficient to enact new laws following the election. Approval by 75 percent of both houses is necessary to amend the Constitution—ensuring the military veto power over any amendments.
To elect a president, each of the two houses and the military representatives will nominate one candidate. A presidential electoral college will be formed from the two houses and the military representatives, and the college will elect the president, with the other two nominees becoming vice presidents.
Therefore, of the remaining 75 percent of parliamentary seats to be contested after the military seats are allocated, the USDP only has to win one-third (plus one) to control the parliament together with the military representatives, thereby having the power to pass laws and appoint the president, who in turn will appoint the judiciary.
So by winning just one-third plus one of the open seats in the election, the military and former military leaders will jointly control the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the new government.
And when the junta’s election laws forced the NLD to choose between expelling its leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners from the organization and competing in the election without them, or be dissolved and not compete in the election at all, it virtually assured the USDP of the seats it needed for parliamentary control.
In addition, under the new Constitution a National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), consisting of 11 ministers and military personnel, will have the power to “discharge the duties assigned to it by the Constitution or any law,” so the military-controlled legislature can give the military-controlled NDSC whatever powers it wants at any time.
The junta’s old strategy for turning the USDA into a people’s militia is even incorporated into the new Constitution.
Section 340 of the chapter called “Defense Services” states: “With the approval of the National Defense and Security Council, the Defense Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people [emphasis added] in the Security and Defense of the Union. The strategy of the people’s militia shall be carried out under the leadership of the Defense Services.”
And finally, just in case the USDP needs assistance in parliament, the junta incorporated various key provisions in the Legislature Chapter of the Constitution that allow the USDA itself to have a voice, if not a vote: Union level organizations will be allowed to speak in parliament and submit bills to the legislature.
Despite the lack of definition or a precise list of Union-level organizations in the Constitution, they are sure to be state-controlled organizations such as the USDA.
The USDP’s Godfather
The USDP’s protective godfather, Than Shwe, is known more for bullying the opposition than outwitting them. But as the military, political and constitutional pieces of his plan to maintain power fall into place, it is apparent that his calculations have been precise and left little room for the opposition to maneuver, both now and in the future.
Than Shwe’s plan is to package the military regime into a formidable political movement ahead of the election.
With respect to the USDP, his strategic moves have ensured that the party will have power, resources, legal impunity and security protection. By comparison, the other new parties will be powerless and lack resources, legal protection and security.
The USDP will certainly campaign heavily in an effort to become synonymous with the regime months before the polls. Assuming the party wins the election, which is heavily stacked in its favor, the Burmese military will have completed the creation of a pyramidal power structure that forms the basis for a future military dynasty, with the armed forces as the foundation, the USDA as the body and the USDP as the head.
Some observers underestimated Than Shwe’s agenda and miscalculated his political shrewdness, assuming the military would be satisfied with a 25 percent position in the new parliament and the ability to block constitutional amendments.
In hindsight, they appear to have misread his real intentions. The junta is simply shedding its skin, and has already grown a new skin underneath to take the place of the old.
Political Parties Registration Law, Article 4(d), states that persons who found a political party may not be Civil Services personnel.
2008 Constitution, Article 26(a), states that Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics.
2008 Constitution, Articles 121(j) and 152(c), together state that Civil Services personnel shall not be entitled to be elected to parliament (other than Defense Services personnel appointed by the commander-in-chief of the Tamadaw in accordance with the military’s 25 percent allocation).
2008 Constitution, Article 64, states that the President and Vice Presidents shall not take part in political party activity during their term in office.
2008 Constitution, Article 232(k), states that Union Ministers shall not take part in political party activity during their term in office.
Whether the registration of the United Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) by the current prime minister and other government ministers violated the Political Party Registration Law (PPRL) depends on whether the prime minister and other ministers who founded the party are “Civil Services personnel,” a term not defined in the PPRL.
Some analysts point to Article 21/9 of Chapter 2 of the Penal Code of the Union of Burma (1963), which says that the term Pyithu Wonhtan, meaning public servant, includes government ministers, and therefore the term Civil Services personnel should be interpreted to include government ministers.
Questioned on the legality of the USDP registration by visiting US diplomat Kurt Campbell, Burma’s Union Election Commission Chairman Thein Soe said: “A provision [in law] says that state services personnel shall not organize political parties, [but] ministers are political posts, not state services personnel.”
However, under the 2008 Constitution, which will go into effect when parliament convenes following the election this year, the President, Vice Presidents and Union Ministers are barred from political party activity while in office.
Therefore, once the elections are held, the new parliament is seated and the 2008 Constitution is in effect, if Prime Minister Then Sein and the other ministers who formed the USDP are ministers in the new government, they will be barred from engaging in political party activity while in office in order to ensure that they do not use their government positions and resources to effect the outcome of future elections.
The question analysts are then asking is this: Why are Prime Minister Thein Sein and the other ministers who formed the USDP not held to the standards of the 2008 Constitution to ensure the current election is free and fair?
Source:http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18659&page=1
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