How will the decision by Burma’s main opposition party to sit out the election affect the political process?As the deadline for political party registration nears, it looks as if none of the major opposition parties will apply to contest this year’s general election in Burma.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) has already announced that it will not register. Having won 80 percent of the national vote at the last election in 1990, the non-participation of the NLD greatly limits the possibility of a government that is representative of the people’s voice.
It is highly likely that a small splinter group within the NLD will form a new party. The majority of NLD members, though, will probably boycott the election process and many voters will show their support by staying at home on polling day.
Indeed an NLD splinter group may find itself courted and promoted by the military junta—used as a propaganda tool to show the international community that the opposition is involved in the election and that Burma is making strides toward democracy.
A splinter group might also sow confusion among voters whose loyalty to NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi will continue to be challenged by the military government and the other competing parties.
Whether the NLD’s decision not to contest the election will turn out to be prudent realpolitik remains to be seen. It may well backfire. However, the moral stance taken by the party cannot be in doubt.
In an April 6 press release, the NLD stated that it would not re-register because the election laws were “unfair and unjust.” Among the new election regulations was the Political Parties Registration Law, that bars the more than 2,000 political prisoners languishing in Burmese jails from the electoral process, including, of course, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Suu Kyi, as well as ethnic Shan leader Hkun Htun Oo and student leader Min Ko Naing.
The NLD made the decision to stand by its “Shwegondaing Declaration,” which calls for the release of political prisoners, a review of the Constitution and an all-inclusive political process. None of these concerns has been addressed by the military junta.
In boycotting this year’s election, the NLD also remains true to its long-standing call for the results of the 1990 election to be recognized.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that over the past 20 years not a single one of the NLD’s political goals has been met—political dialogue with the military toward national reconciliation, honoring the 1990 election result, the release of political prisoners, the withdrawal of the military from politics, and more.
The NLD’s ageing leaders have often been criticized for being intransigent, yet they have managed to maintain unity without any major rifts. They have been imprisoned, marginalized and have forsaken much for the cause of democracy. Their contribution should never be forgotten.
In spite of the military dictatorship’s constant wrath and persecution, the party has maintained nationwide support since its foundation during the pro-democracy uprising of 1988. Its disappearance from the political equation will be an irreplaceable loss.
In the vacuum of a post-NLD Burma, it is difficult to see a dominant opposition force from which social, political and economic ideas will emerge. The polls will barely improve Burma’s relations with the regional and international community, and the sanctions imposed by the US and EU will most likely remain in place.
Assuming the NLD somehow reconstitutes itself as some type of organized or ad hoc movement in the post-election political environment, it will find itself dealing with not just the military junta but also a new parliament.
Naypyidaw will become a fortress of ambitious new parliamentarians and military old-guard. It is easy to imagine that a post-NLD group could be marginalized to the point of being irrelevant.
By the time Suu Kyi is released—an event currently slated for November—the election may have been completed. But in contrast to her situation during previous releases, she will have no official party platform from which to conduct her political affairs. She will always be considered a threat to the military regime and will be treated as a security risk or a “destructive element.”
Though the NLD has not publicly revealed its plans to date, there is little doubt that the democratic movement will continue in some form or another under Suu Kyi’s leadership. It is, however, far from certain whether it will be able to maintain the support of the people in a situation in which they can only initiate political and social movements at a grassroots level.
As things stand in Burma, it is near impossible to form and operate an association, social or political, without registration. And this barrier will remain in place because no existing law has been repealed to date.
Following the election, the new government could well bar all groups outside the current legal framework from undertaking political activities, arguing that ruling and opposition parties already exist in parliament.
Whatever shape the new government takes, the military authorities will maintain a vigilant watch over “former” NLD members. The new legislature could even pass a law to prohibit all registered political parties from engaging in activities with them. In this way, the military can use a divide-and-rule strategy to continue to isolate the opposition.
Several commentators have already written obituaries for the NLD. The months ahead will be crucial to the party’s existence and to Burma’s pro-democracy movement.
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